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Abstract
In contexts such as education and sports, skill-accumulation of individuals over time
crucially depends on the amount of training they receive, which is often allocated on
the basis of repeated selection. We analyze optimal selection policies in a model of
endogenous skill formation where, apart from their ability to transform training into
skills, individuals also differ with respect to relative age. The latter has been identified
by recent empirical research as a major determinant for performance differentials within
cohorts. We find that the optimal policy is pro-competitive at later selection stages in the
sense of selecting the individuals with the higher skill signals. All eventual corrections
due to relative age occur at early stages, where selection is either counter-competitive
(i.e. individuals with low skill signals are selected) or even avoided at all. Thereby, the
induced selection quality is non-monotone in the degree of ex-ante asymmetry due to
relative age. Finally, the (empirical) observation of persistent relative age effects does in
general not hint at suboptimal selection policies.
JEL-Code: J24, M53, I25, I28
Keywords: Skill Formation, Human Capital, Selection, Heterogeneity, Age Effects,
Training, Education
1 Introduction
Motivation In many contexts such as education and sports, individuals accumulate
skills over a long period of time. In doing so, they differ with respect to the amount
of training resources and opportunities received, which in turn is often determined by
a sequence of selection (or streaming) decisions to the effect that a subset of (selected)
individuals is provided with more resources and better opportunities to accumulate skills
than others. Examples in each of the two contexts include access to more advanced
or fast-track curriculum groups and better coaches, more practice time, and stronger
opponents, respectively.
The need to select is often driven by the scarcity of resources such that not every
individual can be trained with high intensity. As a result, efficiency commands to devote
these scarce resources to those individuals where they are most effective in enhancing
skills.
In practice, allocating these resources efficiently across individuals is a major chal-
lenge for decision makers because of two confounding factors both of which are of great
empirical importance in the contexts of education and sports: First, individuals are
typically heterogeneous with respect to their ability to transform the training opportuni-
ties received into skills, and this ability is typically unobservable to the decision maker.
Second, there are often other factors which obscure the eventual “gleaming” (Allen and
Barnsley, 1993) of ability, e.g. through observable performance or skill signals. In the
context of education and sports, one prominent factor of this type is the relative age
of individuals which gives older cohort members (i.e. those who are born shortly after
the cutoff date for cohort membership) a head-start advantage over younger ones. The
existence of potentially sizeable relative-age effects is well-documented by a large body
of recent empirical research, according to which older cohort members perform system-
atically and considerably better than younger ones (for evidence from a large number of
OECD countries, see e.g. Bedard and Dhuey, 2006).
Furthermore, relative age does not only seem to matter during childhood where age
differences (of up to one year) might indeed entail sizeable differences in cognitive and
non-cognitive skills, thereby potentially explaining the better performance of older chil-
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dren. Rather, there is also evidence for age effects to persist even in adolescence and
adulthood, where the direct effect of relative age on skill levels should be negligible: For
example, Bedard and Dhuey (2006) and Sampaio, Da Matta, Ribas, and Sampaio (2011)
find that younger cohort members are significantly less likely to attend university than
older ones. Similarly, Fredriksson and Öckert (2005) find evidence that younger cohort
members receive lower wages on average upon entering the labor market. Finally, in
many sports such as soccer, ice-hockey or tennis, the birth day distribution of top ath-
letes is often markedly different compared to the underlying population (see e.g. Barnsley
and Thompson, 1988; Dudink, 1994; Helsen, Van Winckel, and Williams, 2005; Cobley,
Schorer, and Baker, 2008).
The persistence effect of relative age raises the question concerning the channel
through which it feeds through the whole process of skill formation. In this respect,
it is typically argued (see e.g. Bedard and Dhuey, 2006) that when selection occurs re-
peatedly and on a competitive basis, relative age tends to systematically favor older
cohort members with respect to the availability of skill formation opportunities. For
example, because of their initial edge, older cohort members might systematically re-
ceive more high-intensity training, better access to fast-track or advanced curriculum
programs. This allows them to accumulate more skills than younger members, and it
might even make later human capital investments more valuable (Cunha and Heckman,
2007). As a result of both effects, an initial advantage due to relative age also translates
into a permanent one, in which case an eventual gleaming of ability seems less likely to
occur.
More precisely, under the ‘non-astrology’ (Allen and Barnsley, 1993) assumption that
birth dates and ability are uncorrelated, competitive selection policies will tend to be
erroneous in the sense that training resources will not be devoted to those individuals
for which they are most valuable, but to those with the strongest signals, thereby sys-
tematically favoring older cohort members. Such errors do not only occur in early stages
of the skill formation process (where it is often hard to distinguish between ability and
maturity), but they also persist over time because of path-dependencies which arise when
the effect of training is sufficiently strong such that old cohort members with low-ability
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who do receive high-intensity training continue to outperform their young counterparts
with high-ability who do not.
Surprisingly, while the prevalence of relative-age effects and their persistence are by
now empirically well-documented, the issue of how scarce resources should be allocated
within cohorts to efficiently promote skill formation has received virtually no attention so
far. In this paper, we aim at narrowing this gap by analyzing optimal selection strategies
in a model of endogenous skill formation and age effects.
Framework and Results We consider a dynamic model where individuals accumulate
skills over time, which depend on the amount of training received, the (unobservable)
ability (or talent) to transform training into skills, and their relative age, the latter giving
older cohort members a head-start advantage. In each period, upon receiving a noisy
signal about each individual’s skill, a planner decides on how much training to provide
to each individual. Due to a budget constraint, she can either avoid selection and train
all individuals with equal (intermediate) intensity. Alternatively, she can select a subset
of individuals and provide high-intensity training to these (and low-intensity training
to the remaining ones). We focus on simple selection rules which are either pro- or
counter-competitive in the sense that those individual with high or low skill signals are
selected, respectively, or random in the sense that selection occurs randomly, independent
of the skill signal. The planner’s aim is to maximize the total (or average) skills in the
population at the end of the training process.
Our main results can be summarized as follows: The optimal selection policy is al-
ways pro-competitive at later stages of the selection process, but not necessarily at the
beginning, where all eventual corrections for the asymmetries induced by the initial age
effect take place. Not selecting pro-competitively throughout avoids irreversible path-
dependencies in the sense that those who perform better at the beginning (where old in-
dividuals enjoy a head-start advantage) will also, via the high-intensity training received
upon being selected, be very likely to do so in the future. In this respect, if the initial age
advantage is weak, then a “wait-and-see” policy is optimal under which early selection
is avoided and all individuals receive the same amount of training. Intuitively, unless
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hampered by an erroneous selection, ability will eventually ‘gleam’, thereby leading to
efficient selection decision at later stages. In contrast, when the relative-age advantage
is strong, a more active, counter-competitive policy is optimal which, to ensure a level
playing field, is heavily biased at the beginning in favor of young individuals. By doing
so, efficient selection in later stages is only mildly hampered. Finally, when the relative-
age advantage is medium, the optimal police is also competitive in the beginning which,
because of the induced path-dependencies, leads to a lower selection quality compared to
weak and strong relative-age advantage. Interestingly, this points at a non-monotonic re-
lationship between the degree of ex-ante bias of skill signals (relative-age advantage) and
the induced selection quality in the sense that the latter is highest when the asymmetry
is either small or large, while it is lower in-between.
As a further result, we also find that random selection is never optimal. Last, but
not least, while it is possible to fully avoid a persistent influence of relative age in the
course of the selection process (referred to as relative-age effect), it is not optimal to do
so, and the relative-age effect will always be non-zero (positive of negative) under the
optimal rule. Therefore, the empirical observation of relative-age effects cannot per se
be taken as an indication for the use of non-optimal selection schemes.
Relation to the Literature To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
provide a full-fledged theoretical framework for analyzing optimal selection strategies in
the context of skill formation, where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to ability
and relative age. It is therefore related to the following lines of literature:
Firstly, a large part of the literature is concerned with documenting both the existence
and the persistence of relative-age effect in the context of education (e.g. Bedard and
Dhuey, 2006; McEwan and Shapiro, 2008; Puhani and Weber, 2008; Elder and Lubotsky,
2009; Billari and Pellizzari, 2008; Sprietsma, 2010; Mühlenweg and Puhani, 2010; Sam-
paio, Da Matta, Ribas, and Sampaio, 2011; Jürges and Schneider, 2011) and sports (e.g.
Barnsley and Thompson, 1988; Dudink, 1994; Helsen, Starkes, and Van Winckel, 1998;
Helsen, Van Winckel, and Williams, 2005; Wattie, Baker, Cobley, and Montelpare, 2007;
Cobley, Schorer, and Baker, 2008; Till, Cobley, Wattie, O’Hara, Cooke, and Chapman,
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2010). Our paper complements this line of research by providing a theoretical framework
for a number of resulting policy implications. For example, our results are by and large
consistent with proposals that early stages of the selection process should (i) not be too
competitive (Helsen, Van Winckel, and Williams, 2005), (ii) avoid irreversible decisions
with respect to educational tracks (Sprietsma, 2010; Jürges and Schneider, 2011), and
(iii) show more leniency with respect to binding cutoff dates (Bedard and Dhuey, 2006).
Secondly, with respect to selection errors, our paper formalizes and extends the anal-
ysis of Allen and Barnsley (1993) who point attention to the social costs due to inefficient
allocation of training resources in the presence of age effects. In particular, the optimal
selection rules we characterize are precisely those under which those selection errors are
minimized. Moreover, our analysis reveals under which conditions ability can be ex-
pected to eventually ‘gleam’, in which case the optimal policy is to avoid selection in
early periods.
Thirdly, apart from age and ability, the process of skill formation in our framework
is crucially driven by the intensity of training which individuals receive. In this respect,
our framework is in line with a prominent body of research in social psychology which
stresses the crucial role of training and “deliberate practice” (Ericsson, Krampe, and
Tesch-Römer, 1993) in accumulating expert skills, as opposed to being mainly driven by
innate (born) talent.1
Finally, in our model training and ability are complements in the sense that the
former is more effective for high-ability individuals. Complementarities also play an
important role in the framework by Cunha and Heckman (2007), where the effective-
ness of human capital investments is the higher the stock of skills accumulated in the
past.2 While both frameworks address the issue of skill formation over time, apart from
the different forms of complementarities considered, they differ in a number of further
aspects: First, we explicitly consider age effects. Second, Cunha and Heckman (2007)
1See also Ericsson (2006). This line of research has also sparked a considerable public interest, see
e.g. Dubner and Levitt (2006), Colvin (2008), Coyle (2009), and Gladwell (2008).
2See Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006) for an overview how this theory can be used
to reconcile a large number of empirical findings in the context of skill formation over the life-cycle.
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focus on a given individual’s optimal inter-temporal investment profile so that, because
of the complementarities between previous and current investments, optimal investment
levels should be particularly high at the beginning of the skill formation process in early
childhood. In contrast, we analyze optimal inter-temporal selection policies for a given
cohort of individuals, which is heterogenous with respect to ability and relative age. In
at least one important aspect, however, we view our analysis as complementary: Our
finding that all eventual deviations from a competitive selection policy should occur at
early rounds of selection also points at the crucial importance of the initial phase of the
skill formation process. To further investigate the relationship between the two frame-
works, in Section 5 we extend our basic model to also exhibit complementarities of the
type considered in Cunha and Heckman (2007). Our results appear to be qualitatively
robust also with respect to this extension, where values of the elasticity of substitution
between past and current human capital investments are chosen as estimated in Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach (2010).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The model framework is laid
out in Section 2 and analyzed in Section 3, where we first provide a number of prelim-
inary results and then characterize the optimal selection rule. Section 4 considers the
persistence of relative-age effects. As a robustness check, Section 5 analyzes a number
of model extensions using a computational approach. Finally, Section 6 discusses our
findings and concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
There are two individuals i = 1, 2 and throughout, we use the convention that individual
1 is old and individual 2 is young. Individuals are ex ante identical with respect to
their (unobservable) ability ai ∈ {a, a} which is a random variable where Prob(ai =
a) = Prob(ai = a) =
1
2
for i = 1, 2. Low ability a is normalized to 1 and we write
a = (1 + γ)a = (1 + γ), so that γ > 0 measures the degree of heterogeneity with respect
to ability in the population.
The sequence of events is as follows (see also Figure 1): Individuals aggregate skills
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relative age‐
advantage is
realized
first training
period
second training
period
first selectionabilities are
asigned
second selection skills become
productive
1=t 2=t 3=t
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
over the course of 3 periods t = 1, 2, 3, where the (unobservable) skill sti of individual i
in period t is given by
sti =

ai · δ0i for t = 1,
st−1i + ai · δti for t = 2,
st−1i + λai · δti for t = 3.
(1)
In period t = 1, δ0i denotes the amount of training received by individual i before the
start of the formal skill formation process considered here (e.g. pre-school education at
home), where δ02 = 1 and δ01 = β ≥ 1 which reflects the relative-age advantage of the old
individual 1.
In the subsequent periods 2 and 3, δ2i and δ3i measure the intensity with which in-
dividual i is trained during periods 2 and 3, respectively. Thereby the increase in skills
due to training in period 3 is enlarged by a parameter λ ≥ 1 relative to period 2 which
captures the idea that the second selection stage is the more important one. For example,
in the context of education, the more rigid forms of (formal) streaming (e.g. academic
versus vocational track) are typically preceded by less rigid ones such as math or reading
groups or enrichment programs in primary school. As documented in Bedard and Dhuey
(2006, p. 1470), this is the case for 16 out of the 19 countries considered.3
3As we will show in Section 5 below, when allowing for more than two (equally important) rounds
of selection, λ can also be viewed as to capture all training decisions from period t = 3 onwards, which
naturally leads to λ > 1. Note also that λ ≥ 1 refers to a property of the skill accumulation technology;
it does not reflect any time preference for the different periods in which training occurs.
7
Importantly, in all periods ability and training intensity are complements in increasing
skills, as training is more effective for high-ability individuals. As a result, the aggregate
level of skills in the population will depend on how the training intensities δ2i and δ3i are
assigned across individuals. These assignments are carried out by the planner at the end
of dates t = 1 and t = 2, respectively, subject to the budget constraint
δt1 + δ
t
2 ≤ 2δ. (2)
Thereby, either both individuals are trained equally, i.e. δt1 = δt2 = δ, or one of the
two individuals is selected and receives more intensive training than the other, i.e. δti =
δ + x, δtj = δ − x, i 6= j for some positive x.4 Given the setup of our model, the budget
constraint (2) can safely considered to be binding throughout.
Before assigning training intensities, the planner receives a noisy skill signal sˆti =
sti + η
t
i , where ηti is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2t . In what follows,
we confine attention to selection rules yt which are simple in the sense that they can at
most (but do not have to) condition on these two skill signals, but not on other variables
such as the identity and the age of individuals or previous skill signals or selection
decisions, i.e.
yt : (sˆt1, sˆ
t
2)→ (δt1, δt2) ∈ {δ, δ + x, δ − x}2 for t = 1, 2.
Moreover, as for the dependency on the skills signals, we consider only rules which
are binary in the sense of only conditioning on whether or not the difference of skill
signals is positive or negative, thereby excluding rules which depend on this difference
(or even on other operators) in more sophisticated ways. These restrictions leave us with
the following four selection rules to be considered throughout:
1. pro-competitive selection (P ): select the individual with the higher signal,5
4Alternatively, one could think of instructors (teachers, trainers) of different qualities δ + x, δ, and
δ − x which the planner assigns to each individual.
5In the context of education, selection decisions, such as admission to particular secondary schools,
are often strongly influenced by an applicant’s performance in a competitive ability test (such as
ACT or SSAT). Furthermore, in countries, such as United Kingdom and Japan, there also exist
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2. counter-competitive selection (C): select the individual with the lower signal,
3. random selection (R): ignore the signal and select each individual with probability 1
2
,
4. equal training (E): do not select any individual, but provide equal training of δ to
each of them.
In what follows, we focus on the case where the planner maximizes the total expected
skills after training is over:
max
y1,y2
IE[s31 + s
3
2] s. t. budget constraint (2) (3)
In line with the strand of literature discussed above which argues that to a large ex-
tent, “(stars) are made, not born” (Dubner and Levitt, 2006), we assume throughout that
although ability is an important factor for skill accumulation, the primary determinant
of the speed of skill accumulation is the intensity of training received:
Assumption 1 A low-ability individual which has been selected in a given period ac-
quires more skills during that period than a high-ability individual which has not been
selected, i.e. δ + x > (1 + γ)(δ − x) which is equivalent to γ < γm := 2x
δ−x .
Hence, the assumption gives an upper bound on the heterogeneity with respect to
ability. Furthermore, we rule out scenarios where the relative age advantage is so strong
that it dominates all effects of ability and subsequent training:
Assumption 2 A low-ability old individual with low-intensity training in period 1 has a
lower skill at the end of period 2, than a high-ability young individual with high-intensity
training in period 1, i.e. β+ δ− x < (1 + γ)(1 + δ+ x) which is equivalent to β < βm :=
1 + 2x+ γ(1 + δ + x).
numerous schools, where admission is based solely on the performance in entrance exams. One
example for the latter are grammar schools in Birmingham and Black County in the U.K. (see
www.birmingham.gov.uk/schooladmissions).
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3 Characterizing the Optimal Selection Policy
In characterizing the optimal selection policy, we proceed in three steps: We first provide
some crucial preliminary results (Section 3.1), then consider a benchmark case with
no relative-age advantage (Section 3.2) and finally analyze the case with relative-age
advantage (Section 3.3).
3.1 Preliminaries
Define first the following two ability configurations A := {a1 = a, a2 = a} and A :=
{a1 = a, a2 = a}. Moreover, denote by
µ1 := Prob(s
1
1 > s
1
2|A) and µ1 := Prob(s11 > s12|A),
the probabilities that the old individual sends the higher signal in period 1 under ability
configurations A and A, respectively. Analogously, for period 2, define
µz2 := Prob(s
2
1 > s
2
2|A, z) and µz2 := Prob(s21 > s22|A, z)
as the probabilities that the old individual sends the higher signal in period 2 under
ability configuration A and A and selection history z ∈ {s, n, e}, which denotes the
amount of training which individual 1 has received in period 1, where z = s, z = n,
and z = e indicate high-intensity (δ + x), low-intensity (δ − x) and equal (δ) training,
respectively.
Lemma 1
(i) µ
1
< µ1, µ1 >
1
2
and µ
1
+ µ1 ≥ 1
(ii) µz
2
< µz2, ∀z ∈ {s, n, e}
(iii) µn2 < µe2 < µs2 and µn2 < µ
e
2
< µs
2
Intuitively, as for the part (i), (the old) individual 1 is more likely to send the higher
signal in period 1 under ability of configuration A compared to A. Under configuration
A, this probability is strictly larger than 1
2
because the individual benefits from both
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high ability and a relative-age advantage. The latter also gives individual 1 an overall
advantage across ability configurations. Part (ii) of the Lemma establishes that, for
a given selection history, the probability for individual 1 sending the higher signal in
period 2 is increasing in individual 1’s ability. Finally, as for part (iii), under each ability
configuration, the probability for individual 1 sending the higher signal in period 2 is
increasing in the intensity of training received by individual 1 in period 1.
Consider next in more detail the properties of the different rule types and denote
by Sy1y2 the expected total skills under rules y1 and y2 in the first and second round of
selection, respectively. This can be more generally expressed as
Sy
1y2 = Z +
1
2
[(ω1 − ω1)K + (ωs2ω1 + ωn2 (1− ω1)− ωs2ω1 − ωn2 (1− ω1))λK] (4)
where Z := 2+γ
2
· [(1 + β) + 2δ(1 + λ)] are the expected total skills when selection is
either fully random (y1 = y2 = R) or does not occur at all (y1 = y2 = E). Thereby, the
terms 2+γ
2
, (1 +β) and 2δ(1 +λ) reflect the expected ability of each individual, the total
skill level before training starts, and the total skill increase due to training under either
no and random selection, respectively.
The remaining terms in Eqn. (4) refer to the expected deviations due to the (non-
random) selection process in periods 1 and 2, where K := xγ captures the additional
gain in expected skills if, in a given period, the high-ability individual is selected.6 As
for the probabilities of selection, we define
ω1 := Prob(δ
1
1 = δ + x|A) and ω1 := Prob(δ11 = δ + x|A),
ωz2 := Prob(δ
2
1 = δ + x|A, z) and ωz2 := Prob(δ21 = δ + x|A, z)
for a given period 1 selection history z = s, n, e. Clearly, whether or not these probabil-
ities coincide with those for individual 1 sending the higher signal (µ-notation) depends
on the rule considered: For example, for y1 = P , we have ω1 = µ1 and ω1 = µ1, for
y1 = C, we have ω1 = 1 − µ1 and ω1 = 1 − µ1, and for y1 = R, we have ω1 = ω1 = 12 .
6To see this, note that under both rules EE or RR, the aggregate skill increase in period 2 is
(1 + γ)δ + δ = (2 + γ)δ. Under efficient training, we get (1 + γ)(δ + x) + δ − x = (2 + γ)δ + γx, leading
to a difference of γx.
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Although selection does not occur under rule E, Eqn. (4) nevertheless encompasses the
resulting expected skills as y1 = E leads to ω1 = ω1 = 0, and y2 = E to ωs2 = ωn2 = 0
and ωs2 = ωn2 = 0.7
From this discussion, it follows that maximizing Sy1y2 is just equivalent to choosing
the policy which maximizes the probability of selecting the high-ability individual in
each period. In doing so, in our setup with two rounds the planner can choose from a
set of 42 = 16 rules. The following result establishes that this set can be narrowed down
considerably:
Proposition 1 (Optimal rules) No rule other than PP , CP or EP can be optimal.
Note first that random selection (rule R) is never part of the optimal policy, while
equal training (rule E) can be.8 Moreover, our result that rule P is always optimal in
period 2 suggests that later selection decisions should be made at a competitive basis
(and it implies that ωz2 = µz2 and ωz2 = µz2 throughout for all z = s, n, e). Intuitively,
the expected gain from selecting correctly under configuration A outweighs the loss from
erroneous selection under configuration A, so that rule P outperforms all other rules in
the second selection stage. It is worth noting that, as there is no effort choice in our
model, this result seems qualitatively different from those obtained in the literature on
tournaments and contests in the spirit of Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Tullock (1980),
where competitive and symmetric environments are often desirable, because they elicit
strong effort incentives (see e.g. Amann and Leininger, 1996; Krishna and Morgan, 1997;
Moldovanu and Sela, 2006; Feess, Muehlheusser, and Walzl, 2008).
To ensure that this second selection process is not too unbalanced, all eventual cor-
rections to account for ex ante asymmetries should occur at the first selection stage.
7This highlights a crucial difference between rules E and R: For example, while each individual
receives an expected amount of training of δ under both rules y1 = E and y1 = R, (random) selection
does occur under rule R leading to ωs2 6= ωn2 and ωs2 6= ωn2 . As a result, even though the expected amount
of training in period 1 is the same under these two rules, they are not equivalent.
8The non-optimality of random rules casts serious doubt on the desirability of a recent policy by the
state government of Berlin (Germany) which uses a lottery to allocate a large part of the slots for the
top school track ‘Gymnasium’.
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Therefore, in a next step, we analyze under which conditions, and in which form, such
corrections are desirable. To do so, we compare the performance of the three candidate
rules PP,CP and EP with respect to their induced selection quality resp. the resulting
expected total skills which are given as follows:
SPP = Z +
1
2
[
(µ1 − µ1)K + (µs2µ1 + µn2 (1− µ1)− µs2µ1 − µn2 (1− µ1))λK
]
(5)
SCP = Z +
1
2
[
−(µ1 − µ1)K + (µs2(1− µ1) + µn2µ1 − µs2(1− µ1)− µn2µ1)λK
]
(6)
SEP = Z +
1
2
[
(µe2 − µe2)λK
]
(7)
We refer to a rule (y1y2) as superior to rule (y˜1y˜2) in period t if
IE[(st+11 + s
t+1
2 )− (st1 + st2)|(y1y2)] > IE[(st+11 + st+12 )− (st1 + st2)|(y˜1y˜2)],
which leads to the following result:
Proposition 2 (Superiority)
(i) In period 1, rule PP is superior to both rule CP and EP .
(ii) In period 2, rule PP is superior to rule CP if and only if
(µ1 − (1− µ1)) · (µs2 − µn2 ) + ((1− µ1)− µ1) · (µs2 − µn2 ) > 0. (8)
(iii) In period 2, rule PP is superior to rule EP if and only if(
µs2µ1 + µ
n
2 (1− µ1)− µs2µ1 − µn2 (1− µ1)
)
− (µe2 − µe2) > 0. (9)
(iv) In period 2, rule EP is superior to rule CP if and only if
(µe2 − µe2) +
(
µs2µ1 + µ
n
2 (1− µ1)− µs2µ1 − µn2 (1− µ1)
)
> 0. (10)
While the choice of rule is irrelevant when both individuals have the same ability
of transforming training received into skills, it does matter when abilities differ (i.e.
under configurations A and A), as training is more effective under high-ability. Hence,
any differences in resulting surplus stems from each rule’s performance with respect
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to inducing an efficient selection decision under these two ability configurations. More
precisely, if a rule manages to select the high-ability individual, an efficiency gain of size
K = xγ is realized compared to no (or random) selection.
As for period 1 (part (i) of the Proposition), selection does not occur under rule EP ,
and both low- and high ability individuals receive the same amount of training, so that
the additional gain in skills is zero. In contrast, this gain is positive under rule PP :
Under configuration A, (the high-ability) individual 1 is more likely to be selected than
(the low-ability) individual 2, as µ1 > 1 − µ1 (Lemma 1), leading to an expected gain
compared to rule EP . Under configuration A using PP might lead to an expected loss
compared to EP (for µ
1
> 1
2
), which however is smaller than the expected gain under A
because µ1 > µ1 (again by Lemma 1). Finally, as for rule CP , the expected gains and
losses in period 1 are just reversed compared to rule PP resulting in an expected net
loss relative to both rules PP and EP .
As for period 2 (parts (ii) – (iv) of the Proposition), the same type of comparison
applies, although the resulting conditions as stated in the Proposition are less straightfor-
wardly interpreted. Intuitively, since all three potentially optimal rules exhibit y2 = P ,
their relative performance in period 2 needs to be assessed in terms of selecting high-
ability individuals in the course of the competitive selection process in the second round.
For each rule, this is can be expressed as the difference of individual 1’s selection proba-
bility under configurations A and A, respectively, conditional on the selection history of
the first round.
In this respect, rule PP performs well under configuration A, as individual 1 is already
more likely to be selected in the first round (µ1 > 12). Together with the resulting
high-intensity training, this makes selection likely to occur also in the second. More
precisely, the likelihood of selection in the second round is µ1µs2 + (1− µ1)µn2 as opposed
to (1 − µ1)µs2 + µ1µn2 under rule CP , leading to a difference of (2µ1 − 1)(µs2 − µn2 ) > 0
(Lemma 1).
However, although less so, individual 1 remains advantaged also under configuration
A, and his likelihood of (erroneous) selection under rule PP is µ
1
µs
2
+ (1 − µ
1
)µn
2
, so
that the difference to rule CP becomes (2µ
1
− 1)(µs
2
− µn
2
) ≷ 0. When individual 1’s
14
relative-age advantage is sufficiently large such that µ
1
> 1
2
(which holds for β > 1 + γ,
see Lemma 1), then this difference is again positive, in which case rule CP outperforms
rule PP as it leads to a lower probability of (erroneously) electing (low-ability) individual
1. In this case, the benefit of a more leveled playing field in the second round might even
over-compensate the loss induced by rule CP in the first round of selection.
Finally, as no selection occurs under the “wait-and-see” rule EP in the first round,
there is no danger of enlarging existing asymmetries, but it does also not aid in cor-
recting them. Clearly, to determine which rule is ultimately optimal, both rounds of
selection need to be considered, also taking into account that the second round is the
more important one (λ ≥ 1).
Moreover, apart from the parameters β, γ, λ and x, the exact characterization of the
optimal rule will also hinge on the stochastic properties of the signal technology. In this
respect, it seems realistic to assume that signals become less noisy as time progresses
(i.e. σ21 > σ22). In what follows, we will consider the extreme case σ22 → 0, which allows
for an analytical characterization of the optimal selection rule.9
Lemma 2 (Limit properties of second round signals) Assume that σ22 → 0. Then,
(i)
µe2 → 1, µs2 → 1, µs2 → 1, µn2 → 0
(ii) there exists a threshold βe := 1 + γ(1 + δ) such that µe
2
→ 1 if β > βe and µe
2
→ 0
if β < βe. Moreover, βe is increasing in γ.
(iii) there exists a threshold βn := 1+2x−γ(δ−x)
1+γ
such that µn2 → 1 if β > βn and µn2 → 0
if β < βn. Moreover, βn is decreasing in γ.
Intuitively, the Lemma simply allows to further highlight the properties of the differ-
ent rules in terms of their selection quality in round 2.10 Hence, because of µe2 → 1, rule
9Using a computational framework, we will verify in Section 5 below that our main results do not
qualitatively depend in this extreme assumption.
10Recall from Proposition 1 that ωz2 = µz2 and ω
z
2 = µ
z
2 holds for all z ∈ {s, n, e}, as all three relevant
rules exhibit y2 = P .
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EP ensures that individual 1 is always selected in the second round under configuration
A. Moreover, since µs2 → 1 and µs2 → 1, rule PP is “path-dependent” in the sense that
it always selects individual 1 in the second round again, if 1 was already selected in the
first round. Clearly, this is efficient under configuration A, but not under configuration
A. Finally, since µn
2
→ 0, by biasing the first round against individual 1 (so that the se-
lection history is indeed likely to be z = n), rule CP is helpful in avoiding that individual
1 is inefficiently selected in the second round.
While all limit values in part (i) are independent of the size of the relative-age ad-
vantage (β), parts (ii) and (iii) consider the two remaining cases µe
2
and µn2 , for which
the limit value does depend on β; and which in turn will have crucial implications for
the characterization of the optimal rule below.
As for part (ii), at β = βe, both individuals have the same skill (and hence the same
expected signal) after one round of equal training under configuration A (i.e. βe + δ =
(1 + γ)(1 + δ)). Hence, for all β < βe, individual 2 will always be selected under EP
(µe
2
→ 0). Therefore, in combination with µe2 → 1 from part (i), this implies that rule
EP will always select efficiently in round 2 as long as long as β is small (β < βe). In
contrast, for β > βe individual 1’s skill (and expected signal) is higher under both ability
configurations A and A after one period of equal training, so that individual 1 will always
be selected under rule EP in the second round (i.e. even under configuration A). Finally,
βe is increasing in γ, since an increase in β is required to compensate the larger ability
advantage of individual 2.
As for part (iii), at β = βn, both individuals have the same skill (and hence the same
expected signal) under configuration A when individual 2 was selected in the first round
(i.e. (1 + γ)(βn + δ − x) = 1 + δ + x). Hence, for A and all β > βn, individual 1 will
always be selected in the second round, regardless of the selection history z = n, s, e (by
definition of βn this holds even for z = n, and hence a fortiori for z = s and z = e). In
this case, rule CP always efficiently selects individual 1 under configuration A. As for
configuration A whether or not 2 is selected depends on the selection history z: for z = s
efficient selection does not occur (µs
2
→ 1), but for z = n it does (µn
2
→ 0) and, as shown
above, this latter history is likely to occur under rule CP . Finally, βn is decreasing in γ,
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because with a larger γ a lower β is required to compensate for individual 1’s training
disadvantage in the first round.
Given the two thresholds βe and βn, it is useful to categorize the range of admissible
values β ∈ [1, βm) as follows:
Definition 1 (Weak, medium and strong relative-age advantage) The relative-age
advantage (β) is called weak for 1 ≤ β < βe, medium for βe < β < max(βe, βn), and
strong for max(βe, βn) < β < βm.11
In the light of the discussion of Lemma 2, the definition can be usefully interpreted as
follows: when the relative-age advantage is weak, one period of equal training (thereby
avoiding selection) suffices to get an efficient selection decision in period 2 under both
ability configurations. When it is no longer weak (i.e. β > βe), selection is warranted
and this leads to the issue of “path-dependencies”, i.e. whether or not an individual
which has been selected in the first round will also always be selected in the second,
thereby potentially perpetuating any erroneous choice made in period 1. In this respect,
when the relative-age advantage is medium, such path-dependencies necessarily exist as
an individual is selected in the second round if only if it was already selected in the first
round (as µs2 → 1, µn2 → 0, µs2 → 1, and µn2 → 0); when it is strong, however, they can be
avoided (as µn
2
→ 1). As one implication, the selection quality can in fact be increasing
in the strength of the relative-age advantage (see section 3.3).
Furthermore, comparing βe and βn, since βe (βn) is increasing (decreasing) in γ,
βe < βn holds if and only if
γ <
x
1 + δ
. (11)
Clearly, as γ increases, the importance of training becomes smaller compared to ability.
In this respect, a further definition turns out to be useful for the characterization of the
optimal rule:
Definition 2 (Weak and strong heterogeneity) The heterogeneity with respect to
ability (γ) is weak if γ < x
1+δ
, while it is strong for γ ≥ x
1+δ
.
11Note that for max(βe, βn) = βe, the set of values with intermediate relative-age advantage is empty.
Moreover, it follows from the definitions of βn and βm (see Assumption 2) that βn < βm holds.
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Note that x
1+δ
< ym, so that the Definition does not interfere with Assumption 1.
3.2 Benchmark: No Relative Age Advantage (β = 1)
As it allows to highlight some crucial properties of the three rules PP,CP and EP , it is
instructive to discuss first a benchmark case without relative-age advantage (β = 1), so
that there is only heterogeneity with respect to ability (γ).12 Moreover, as will become
clear in subsection 3.3 below, the optimal rule characterized next is valid not only for
β = 1, but for the whole range of weak relative-age advantage:
Proposition 3 (Benchmark: No relative-age advantage) Assume that β = 1.
(i) There exists a λ∗ such that rule EP is optimal if λ > λ∗ and σ22 sufficiently small.
(ii) If γ > Φ−1
(
3
4
)√
2σ21 then λ∗ > 1 and rule PP is optimal for 1 ≤ λ < λ∗ and
σ22 sufficiently small, where Φ is the distribution function of a standard Gaussian
distribution with mean zero and variance one.
(iii) Rule CP is never optimal.
As explained above, rule CP is particularly beneficial for large levels of relative-age
advantage, and hence never optimal in the case where β = 1 considered here.
The comparison of rules EP and PP is driven by both the degree of heterogeneity
with respect to ability (γ) and the relative importance of the two selection stages (λ).
In this respect, recall first from the discussion of part (i) of Proposition 2, that any
potential gain from exploiting the higher complementarities between ability and training
for high-ability individuals in the first round of selection (K = xγ) is forfeited under
rule EP , but not under rule PP . Obviously, this gain increasing in γ. Moreover, as γ
increases, ability is more likely to ‘gleam’ in the first selection stage, as ω1 and ω1 are
increasing and decreasing in γ, respectively, so that the difference ω1 − ω1 is increasing
in γ. Both effects make rule PP more desirable compared to rule EP . On the other
12There is no need to consider another benchmark case with γ = 1 (and β > 1) since selection does
not matter in that case.
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relative-age advantage (β)
weak medium strong
β ∈ [1, βe) βe < β < max(βe, βn) β > max(βe, βn)
heterogeneity (γ)
weak (γ < x
1+δ
) EP PP CP
strong (γ ≥ x
1+δ
) EP n.a. CP
Table 1: The optimal selection rule (Proposition 4)
hand, the crucial advantage of rule EP over PP is that it always selects the high-ability
individual in the second round as long as the relative-age advantage is weak (i.e. for
β < βe), while rule PP fails to accomplish this if the low-ability individual has been
(erroneously) selected in the first round (as µs
2
→ 1, see Lemma 2). The optimal rule
therefore reflects a trade-off between all of these effects and rule EP is optimal whenever
the second round is sufficiently important, i.e. when λ is sufficiently large. As argued
above, this seems to be the more relevant case in our context(s), such that we will focus
on it throughout.
3.3 The Optimal Rule Under Relative Age Advantage (β > 1)
Consider now the case where individuals are not only heterogeneous with respect to
ability, but where there is also a relative-age advantage of individual 1 (β > 1). Building
on our previous results, the optimal rule can then be characterized as follows:
Proposition 4 (Optimal rule with relative-age advantage) Assume that σ22 is suf-
ficiently small, and that λ is sufficiently large.
(i) When the relative-age advantage is weak, rule EP is optimal.
(ii) When the relative-age advantage is strong, rule CP is optimal.
(iii) When the heterogeneity with respect to ability is weak and the relative-age advantage
is medium, rule PP is optimal.
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Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 2 and summarized in Table 1. As for the intuition
of part (i), the highly desirable feature of the “wait-and-see” rule EP of always selecting
the high-ability individual in the second round of selection (after providing equal training
in the first round) holds for all β < βe (Lemma 2). As a result, for the whole range [1, βe)
of weak relative-age advantage, the results from the benchmark with β = 1 (Proposition
3) are qualitatively preserved so that, for λ large, rule EP remains optimal.
As for cases (ii) and (iii) where the relative-age advantage is either medium or strong,
rule EP ceases to be optimal as it is highly erroneous in that always selects individual 2
in the second round of selection. In these cases, recall that for β > βn, rule CP always
selects individual 1 under configuration A, independent of the selection decision in the
first round. Furthermore, as long as β < βm, it also efficiently selects individual 2 under
configuration A, provided that the selection history was z = n, which for y1 = C occurs
with probability µ1 > 12 .
Hence, under strong heterogeneity (case (ii) of the Proposition) where βe > βn, rule
CP is optimal for all β > βe when the second round of selection is sufficiently important
(i.e. for λ large). Similarly, under weak heterogeneity (case (iii) of the Proposition),
βe < βn, so that rule CP is optimal for all β > βn. Note that strongly favoring the
young individual 2 under CP is optimal here, even though the planner is by assumption
not concerned with the distribution of final skills across individuals, but he only cares
about the sum.
Finally, (only) under weak heterogeneity, there exists an interval (βe, βn) of medium
relative-age advantage which exhibits a path dependency in the sense that the individual
which is selected in period 1 is always also selected in period 2.13 As a consequence, rule
CP performs badly under configuration A, since with probability µ1 > 12 individual 2
is selected in period 1, and therefore is selected again in period 2. Accordingly, in this
interval, rule PP is optimal: While favoring individual 1 instead, it does so at a less
extreme level and therefore outperforms rule CP .
13As βn < βe holds under strong heterogeneity, the set of values where the relative-age advantage is
intermediate is empty.
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Figure 2: Illustration of optimal rule
Consider now in more detail the impact of the relative-age advantage on the selection
quality. In Figure 2, each panel depicts the induced total expected surplus due to training
under each of the three relevant rules.14 For the sake of illustration, we subtract s1+ :=
IE [s11 + s12] =
(2+γ)(1+β)
2
from the toal expected surplus function, thereby eliminating the
direct (positive) effect of a higher β in period 1 (i.e. before selection starts), such that
only the indirect effect due to selection remains. Note first that in both panels (a) and
(b), the respective function for rules EP and PP are decreasing in β throughout. This is
intuitive, since a larger value of β increases the head-start advantage of (old) individual
1, thereby leading to more erroneous selection under configuration A.
In contrast, under rule CP it is increasing in β. The intuition for this – somewhat
counter-intuitive– result is that for y1 = C the probability of efficiently selecting indi-
vidual 2 in period 1 (and hence also in period 2) under configuration A is the higher, the
larger the head-start advantage of individual 1. Of course, this also makes erroneous se-
lection in period 1 more likely under configuration A. But in the range β > max(βe, βn)
where rule CP is optimal, this has no detrimental effect on the expected total surplus,
as individual 1 is nevertheless always selected in period 2 by definition of βn.
14The parameter values used throughout for the case of weak and strong heterogeneity are γ = 0.1
and γ = 0.2, respectively. Moreover, for both cases we use δ = 0.85, x = 0.15, σ21 = 0.1 and λ = 15.
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4 Relative Age Effect under the Optimal Rule
As discussed in the Introduction, one main issue in the empirical literature is whether
initial advantages due to (relative) age tend to be perpetuated throughout the overall
process of skill accumulation. In order to address this issue within our framework, we
therefore distinguish between age-related skill differences which are due to a relative age
advantage (β), and those arising as a result of subsequent selection decisions, referred to
relative age effect.
As a measure for the relative-age effect, we use the expected difference in skills be-
tween an old and a young individual as induced between periods 1 (i.e. before training
starts) and 3 (i.e. after training is over). Hence, we are again interested only in differ-
ences as induced by the selection decisions, and therefore subtract the (initial) advantage
of the old individual in period 1 due to relative age, s1− := IE [s11 − s12] = (2+γ)(β−1)2 > 0.15
This leads to the following measure for the relative-age effect as induced under rules y1
and y2:
By
1y2 = IE
[
s31 − s32
]− s1−
Note first that full elimination of the relative-age effect (i.e. By1y2 = 0) is easily
achieved either by rule RR (random selection) or EE (no selection at all), thereby on
average neither enlarging nor reducing any skill differences due to relative-age advantage.
However, as has been shown above, neither of these rules is optimal and therefore a
relative age effect will arise under the optimal rule, and – through the induced selection
decisions – the size of which does depend on the (initial) relative age advantage:
Proposition 5 Assume that σ22 is sufficiently small, and that λ is sufficiently large.
(i) When the relative-age advantage is weak so that rule EP is optimal, BEP > 0.
(ii) When the relative-age advantage is medium so that rule PP is optimal, BPP > 0
and increasing in β
15In the empirical literature discussed above, the term s1− is typically not subtracted (presumably due
to lack of the respective information), and only the final outcomes are compared.
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(iii) When the relative-age advantage is strong so that rule CP is optimal, BCP (β =
βn) < BPP (β = βn) might hold, and BCP is decreasing in β
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5
0
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Figure 3: The size of the relative-age effect under the optimal rule
The proposition is illustrated in Figure 3 which depicts the relative-age effect for the
relevant rules, using the same parametrization as in panel (a) of Figure 2. As already
noted, the relative-age effect is always non-zero under the optimal rule. In particular, it
is strictly positive when the relative-age advantage is either weak or medium such that
rules EP and PP are optimal. Moreover, while almost constant as long as rule EP is
optimal due to efficient selection, it is increasing in β under rule PP , because of the
induced path-dependency which tends to favor individual 1.
In contrast, when the relative-age advantage becomes strong such that the optimal
rule switches to CP (which occurs at β = βn), then the relative-age effect typically
exhibits a downward jump (and it can even become negative as in the case depicted
in Figure 3) which is due to the fact that rule CP now heavily favors individual 2 in
the first selection decision such that the relative age advantage of the old individual is
overcompensated prior to the second selection stage.16 Moreover, in the whole range
16It should be noted that BCP < 0 for some β > βn does not hold for all permissible parameter
constellations. In particular for σ21 sufficiently large, we have BCP ≈ BPP > 0
23
where rule CP is optimal, the relative-age effect is decreasing in β. Intuitively, a higher
β increases the likelihood of selecting individual 2 in period 1, thereby further reducing
the relative-age effect.
Overall, apart from the fact that it is not optimal to induce B = 0, also values B ≶ 0
are not necessarily a good indicator for the induced selection quality: to see this, recall
from Proposition 4, that the induced selection quality is particularly high when either
rules EP or rule CP are optimal, where BEP > 0 always holds and where BCP < 0 can
hold. Hence, our results suggest that the mere empirical observation of a relative age
effect is per se no indication of a suboptimal selection scheme.
5 Robustness
In order to derive our previous results analytically, we have made several simplifying as-
sumptions. The aim of this section is to show computationally that our main analytical
results (see Proposition 4) are qualitatively robust, when several key assumptions are
relaxed. In particular we will consider the following generalizations: (a) non-negligible
noise of the second-stage skill signal (σ22 >> 0); (b) more than two ability types; (c)
cohort size larger than two; (d) more than two selection stages; (e) in addition to ability,
the productivity of training also depends on current skills. In order to be able to dis-
tinguish between the implications of each of the considered generalizations, we consider
each extension separately. Moreover, we confine attention to the (richer) case of weak
heterogeneity (see Table 1) and, for the sake of comparison and where appropriate, also
use the same parametrization as for panel (a) of Figure 2 and Figure 3.
As illustrated in Figure 4, our analytical results appear to be largely robust with
respect to these extensions: In panel (a) we increase the level of noise in the second
selection stage to σ22 = 0.03, while keeping σ21 = 0.1 so that our assumption that signals
become less noisy over time is smaller remains satisfied. Panel (b) depicts a case with 7
ability types, where the range and the mean of the ability distribution are the same as in
our basic model. In panel (c), we extend the cohort size to 10, where each individual has
high ability with probability 0.5. Hence, under yt = P (C), t = 1, 2 the five individuals
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(b) More Ability Types (7)
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Figure 4: Robustness Checks
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with the highest (lowest) signals are selected. For all three extensions we have verified
numerically that the set of optimal rules remains {PP,EP,CP} and, as observed in
Figure 4 the transition between the optimal rules is very similar to the basic model, and
then even the threshold values of β, where the transitions occur, differ only slightly.
Panel (d) depicts the case where the number of selection periods is increased to eight,
and where equal weight λt = 1 is put on all periods t = 1...8. Again, the main qualitative
features of the basic model are preserved. First, all eventual corrections occur at early
stages of the selection process, and rule P is optimal for all, but at most the first two
selection periods. This feature provides an additional motivation for assuming λ > 1 in
the basic model, as it can be interpreted as a reduced form to capture all of these later
selection periods where rule P is optimal. As for these early periods of selection, the
transition pattern is also in accordance with the basic model, where rule E is optimal
when the relative-age advantage is weak, while rule C is optimal when it is strong. The
only difference occurs in the case of medium relative-age advantage, where the transition
to rule P is delayed by one further period of equal training.
Last, but not least, as for extension where the skill formation exhibits inter-temporal
complementarities in the spirit of Cunha and Heckman (2007) and Cunha, Heckman,
and Schennach (2010), we consider the following CES-function of skill formation:
si,t+1 =
(
sαi,t + (λtδi,tai)
α)1/α , i = 1, 2, t = 1, .., T,
where α ∈ (∞, 1] denotes the (constant) elasticity of substitution between past and
current human capital investments (and where α = 1 would lead back to our basic
model). The now nonlinear nature of the production function again requires multiple
periods of selection, and we consider six such periods where λt = 3 for all t = 2, .., 6.
Panel (e) depicts the results for α = 0.6 which is close to the value obtained by Cunha,
Heckman, and Schennach (2010) in their estimations for cognitive skills (see p. 908,
Table 1). Again, our main qualitative results appear robust also with respect to this
extension, in particular the optimality of rule P in the later selection periods, and the
transition from rule E to rule P and finally to rule C in the early ones as β increases.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has characterized optimal selection rules in a stylized model of repeated
selection in the presence of heterogeneity of individuals with respect to both ability and
age within a cohort. Assuming that the objective is to maximize expected total skills at
the end of the training process, it has been shown that deviations from a competitive rule
– which selects the individuals with the higher skill signals for high intensity training
– should only occur at the initial selection round(s). For low levels of relative age
advantage, no selection should be made, whereas for high levels, the individuals with
the lowest skill signals should be selected for high intensity training. It is noteworthy
that this last result, which has a flavor of an equalizing policy, is obtained although
(in)equality considerations are not assumed to be part of the objective of the planner.
Moreover, the larger the degree of heterogeneity with respect to ability within the cohort,
the larger the parameter range of relative age advantage for which counter-competitive
selection is optimal.
One might be tempted to predict that a stronger initial relative age advantage (β),
which distorts the link between ability and skill signals, should make the allocation of
high-intensity training to high-ability individuals more difficult. However, it turns out
that under the optimal selection rule the total expected skills attained during the training
period are U-shaped with respect to the size of relative-age advantage (β), and therefore
actually increasing in β when β is relatively large. Finally, our analysis also shows that
the existence of a positive relative age effect is per se no indication for the use of a
sub-optimal selection scheme for the allocation of training to individuals.
Although the robustness of our qualitative findings with respect to the relaxation
of several assumptions has already been confirmed in this paper, several variations of
the considered setup would be worth exploring. In particular, it would be interesting
to analyze alternative objective functions, taking into account equality considerations or
short term objectives of the teachers (or trainers) in charge of the training in the different
periods. Also, assuming constant returns to training for each individual throughout the
training process is quite strong, and it should be explored whether the qualitative insights
remain when considering decreasing returns instead. Finally, although the simple ’cutoff-
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type’ selection rules considered in this paper are frequently used in the real world, from
a theoretical perspective it would be interesting to explore the implications of allowing
the planner to use more complex rules for allocating training intensities to individuals.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Part (i): Note that
µ
1
= IP[β + η11 > (1 + γ) + η
1
2] = IP[∆η1 < β − (1 + γ)],
µ1 = IP[β(1 + γ) + η
1
1 > 1 + η
1
2] = IP[∆η1 < β(1 + γ)− 1],
where ∆η1 := η12 − η11 is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 2σ21. The first
two claims follow directly from β(1+γ)−1 > max[0, β− (1+γ)]. The third claim is due
to β− (1 +γ) +β(1 +γ)−1 = (β−1)(2 +γ) ≥ 0 (ii): Follows directly from the fact that
for a given selection decision z in period 1 the difference in expected skills IE[s21 − s22] is
always higher in case A compared to A. Part (iii) follows directly from the fact that for
given abilities of both individuals the difference in expected skills IE[s21−s22] is increasing
in the amount of training individual 1 receives in period 1. 
Proof of Proposition 1 As a first step we show that in the second selection period
it is never optimal to choose either the R or the E rule. Furthermore, y2 = C can only
be optimal if y1 = C, i.e. if rule C has already chosen in the first selection period. To
see this, note that
IE
[
(s31 + s
3
2)− (s21 + s22)|sˆ21, sˆ22
]
=

λ(2 + γ)δ y2 = R,E
λ(2 + γ)δ + 2λK(
IP[sˆ21 > sˆ22|A]− IP[sˆ21 > sˆ22|A]
)
y2 = P
λ(2 + γ)δ − 2λK(
IP[sˆ21 > sˆ22|A]− IP[sˆ21 > sˆ22|A]
)
y2 = C.
This implies that choosing E or R is dominated either by P or by C. Furthermore,
P is optimal in period 2, whenever
IP[sˆ21 > sˆ
2
2|A]− IP[sˆ21 > sˆ22|A] ≥ 0. (12)
The exact expression for these two probabilities depends on the selection rule used in
the first stage (y1). In particular for the four possible choices in period 1 condition (12)
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reduces to
µs2 + µ
n
2 ≥ µs2 + µn2 y1 = R
µe2 ≥ µe2 y1 = E
µ1µ
s
2 + (1− µ1)µn2 ≥ µ1µs2 + (1− µ1)µn2 y1 = P
(1− µ1)µs2 + µ1µn2 ≥ (1− µ1)µs2 + µ1µn2 y1 = C.
It follows directly from Lemma 1 that the condition is satisfied for y1 = R and y1 = E
so that y2 = P is optimal in period 2 if E or R have been chosen in the first period.
Considering the inequality for y1 = P , we have
µs2µ1 + µ
n
2 (1− µ1)− µs2µ1 − µn2 (1− µ1) (13)
= (µs2 − µs2) + (1− µ1)(µn2 − µs2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
) + (1− µ
1
)(µs
2
− µn
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
> (µs2 − µs2) + (1− µ1)(µn2 + µs2 − µn2 − µs2)
= µ
1
(µs2 − µs2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
) + (1− µ
1
)(µn2 − µn2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
)
> 0,
which implies that P is also optimal in period 2. Finally, if C was chosen in period 1,
then P is optimal in period 2 if
(1− µ1)µs2 + µ1µn2 − (1− µ1)µs2 − µ1µn2 ≥ 0. (14)
Otherwise, CC yields higher total expected skills than CP . However, it can be shown
that PP always dominates CC: To see this observe that expected total skills under PP
and CC are given by
SPP = Z +
1
2
[
(µ1 − µ1)K + (µs2µ1 + µn2 (1− µ1)− µs2µ1 − µn2 (1− µ1))λK
]
(15)
SCC = Z +
1
2
[
−(µ1 − µ1)K − (µs2(1− µ1) + µn2µ1 − µs2(1− µ1)− µn2µ1)λK
]
(16)
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Hence, we obtain
SPP − SCC
=
1
2
[
(µ1 − (1− µ1))K
]
+
1
2
(
µs2µ1 + µ
n
2 (1− µ1)− µs2µ1 − µn2 (1− µ1) + µs2(1− µ1) + µn2µ1 − µs2(1− µ1)− µn2µ1
)
λK
=
1
2
[
2(µ1 − µ1)K +
(
µs2 + µ
n
2 − µs2 − µn2
)
λK
]
> 0,
as both terms in the square bracket are positive (by parts (i) and (ii) of Lemma 1).
Therefore, rule CC is never optimal, and hence any optimal rule stipulates y2 = P .
To complete the proof, it remains to rule out that ruleRP can be optimal. Calculating
the expected total skills for both rules RP and CP gives
SRP = Z +
1
2
[
1
2
(µs2 + µ
n
2 − µs2 − µn2 )λK
]
(17)
SCP = Z +
1
2
[
−(µ1 − µ1)K + (µs2(1− µ1) + µn2µ1 − µs2(1− µ1)− µn2µ1)λK
]
(18)
Therefore, SRP = 1
2
(SPP + SCP ), which implies SRP ≤ max[SPP , SCP ]. 
Proof of Proposition 2 Taking the difference between (5) and (6) yields
SPP − SCP = 1
2
[
2(µ1 − µ1) + λ(2µ1 − 1) · (µs2 − µn2 ) + (1− 2µ1) · (µs2 − µn2 )
]
K. (19)
By part (i) of Lemma 1, the first term of the sum in the bracket, which corresponds to
the skill increases in period 2, is positive, and therefore rule PP is superior to rule CP
in period 1. The second term corresponding to skill gains in period 3 is positive if and
only if (8) holds. Analogous reasoning applies to the comparison of rule EP (see (7))
with rules PP and CP . 
Proof of Lemma 2 As for part (i), note first that for σ22 → 0 the probability that
individual 1 sends the higher signal in period 2 goes to 1 if IE[s21 − s22] > 0, and to 0 if
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IE[s21 − s22] < 0. The Lemma then follows from:
E[s21 − s22] =

(1 + γ)(β + δ)− (1 + δ) > 0 if A, z = e
(1 + γ)(β + δ + x)− (1 + δ − x) > 0 if A, z = s
(β + δ + x)− (1 + γ)(1 + δ − x) > 0 if A, z = s
(β + δ − x)− (1 + γ)(1 + δ + x) < 0 if A, z = n,
where the inequalities in lines three and four follow from Assumptions 1 and 2.
Concerning part (ii), we have for A and z = e
E[s21 − s22] = (β + δ)− (1 + γ)(1 + δ),
which is positive if and only if β > βe. Moreover, we have ∂β
e
∂γ
= 1 + δ > 0.
Similarly, as for part (iii) we get for A and z = n
E[s21 − s22] = (1 + γ)(β + δ − x)− (1 + δ + x)
which is positive if and only if β > βn. Moreover, we have ∂β
n
∂γ
= −1−δ−x
(1+γ)2
< 0. 
Proof of Proposition 3 As for part (i), using Lemma 2 and the fact that for β = 1
we have limσ22→0 µ
e
2
= limσ22→0 µ
n
2 = 0 we obtain that for small σ22
SEP − SPP ≈ 1
2
[0 + λ(1− 0)]K − 1
2
[
(µ1 − µ1) + λ(µ1 + 0− µ1 − 0)
]
K
=
1
2
[
λ− (1 + λ)(µ1 − µ1)
]
K.
Define λ∗ =
µ1−µ1
1−(µ1−µ1)
. It is now obvious that for λ < λ∗ PP dominates EP for
sufficiently small σ22, whereas the opposite statement holds for λ > λ∗.
As for part (ii), taking into account that µ1− µ1 = 2IP(∆η1 ≤ γ)− 1 and that
∆η1√
2σ21
has
a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and variance one, it is easy to see that λ∗ ≥ 1 is
equivalent to
2Φ
(
γ√
2σ21
)
≥ 1
2
+ 1.
Part (ii) of the Proposition follows directly.
As for part (iii), comparing PP with CP for β = 1 and small σ22 we get as above
SPP − SCP ≈ (1 + λ)(µ1 − µ1)K > 0 ∀λ ≥ 1,
and therefore rule CP is not optimal. 
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Proof of Proposition 4 To prove the three claims of this Proposition, we first consider
how the signs of the differences SPP − SCP , SPP − SEP and SEP − SCPdepend on β.
Comparing the expected total skills under rules PP and CP we obtain from (5) and
(6)
SPP − SCP = (µ1 − µ1)K +
λ
2
(
(2µ1 − 1)(µs2 − µn2 ) + (1− 2µ1)(µs2 − µn2 )
)
K (20)
Expression (20) is positive if the bracket in the second term is positive. Conversely, if
the bracket is negative, then (20) is negative for sufficiently large λ. Using Lemma 2 this
bracket can be approximated for small σ22 by
(2µ1 − 1)(1− µn2 ) + (1− 2µ1).
It is straightforward to see that for β > βe we have µ
1
> 1
2
and therefore 1 − 2µ
1
< 0.
Taking further into account that µ1 > µ1 (part (i) of Lemma 1) it follows directly from
part (iii) of Lemma 2 that this expression reduces to 2(µ1 − µ1) > 0 for β < βn and to
1− 2µ
1
< 0 relative-age advantage is strong (β > βn). This implies that CP dominates
PP relative-age advantage is strong and λ is large. Furthermore, if (11) holds, and
therefore βn > βe, both for medium relative-age advantage (β ∈ (βe, βn)) and for weak
relative-age advantage (β < βe) rule PP dominates CP .
Comparing rules rules PP and EP we obtain from (5) and (7)
SPP − SEP = 1
2
(µ1 − µ1)K +
λ
2
(
µs2µ1 + µ
n
2 (1− µ1)− µs2µ1 − µn2 (1− µ1)− µe2 + µe2
)
K.
Using again Lemma 2 we approximate the bracket in the second term by
µ1 + µ
n
2 (1− µ1)− µ1 − 1 + µe2. (21)
For β > βe it follows from part (ii) of Lemma 2 that this expression is equal to µ1 −
µ
1
+ µn2 (1 − µ1) > 0 and therefore SPP > SEP for all λ. Together with the discussion
above this shows that PP is optimal if the relative-age advantage is medium, whereas
CP is optimal for a strong relative-age advantage which proves parts (ii) and (iii) of the
Proposition.
To prove part (i) we consider note first that it follows from above that if the relative-
age advantage is weak, then EP dominates PP for large λ. Comparing EP and CP we
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obtain
SEP − SCP = 1
4
(µ1 − µ1)K +
λ
4
(
µe2 − µe2 − µs2(1− µ1)− µn2µ1 + µs2(1− µ1) + µn2µ1
)
K.
For the case of weak relative-age advantage the bracket in the second term can under
consideration of Lemma 2 be approximated for small σ22 by (1 + µ1(1 − µn2 ) − µ1) > 0.
Hence, rule EP is optimal if the relative-age advantage is weak and λ is large. 
Proof of Proposition 5 Direct calculations show that for σ22 → 0 and β < βe the
relative age effect under the EP rule converges to
B¯EP =
λ(2 + γ)x
2
> 0,
which proves part (i).
In oder to express the value of BPP and BCP we have to extend our notation for
the probability that the old individual is selected in stage t = 1, 2 to the scenarios
A¯ := {a1 = a2 = a¯} and A := {a1 = a2 = a}. Obviously, for any β > 1 we have
µ¯1 > µ
1
>
1
2
, lim
σ22→0
µ¯s2 = µ
s
2
= 1
and for β < βn
lim
σ22→0
µ¯n2 = lim
σ22→0
µn
2
= 0.
Using this notation we obtain that for β < βn the relative age effect under the PP rule
converges to
B¯PP =
(
(2 + γ)
µ
1
+ µ1 − 1 + µ¯1
2
x− (µ¯1 − µ
1
)x
)
+λ
[
(2 + γ)
µ1 + µ1 + 2(µ¯1 − 1)
4
x− (µ¯1 − µ
1
)x
]
.
Taking into account that each of the expressions µ1, µ1, µ¯1 and µ1
is increasing in β
and they all have positive coefficients in the square bracket term, which is multiplied by
λ, it is clear that B¯PP is increasing in β for sufficiently large λ. Furthermore, it should be
noted that for any probability µ¯z2, z ∈ {s, n, r, e} with limσ22→0 µz2 = 0 or limσ22→0 µz2 = 1
we have limσ22→0
∂µz2
∂β
= 0. Together, this implies that BPP is increasing in β.
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Concerning the sign of B¯PP we obtain for the second term in the sum[
(2 + γ)
µ1 + µ1 + 2(µ¯1 − 1)
4
x− (µ¯1 − µ
1
)x
]
=
x
4
[
(2 + γ)
(
µ1 + µ1
)
+ (1 + γ)2(µ¯1 − 1) + 2(µ¯1 − 1)− 4(µ¯1 − µ
1
)
]
=
x
4
[
γ
(
µ1 + µ1
)
+ 2
(
µ1 + µ1 − µ¯1
)
+ (1 + γ)2(µ¯1 − 1) +
(
4µ
1
− 2
)]
≥ 0
Therefore the coefficient of λ in B¯PP is positive and it is easy to see that the first term
is even larger than this expression. Hence, BPP > 0, which proves (ii).
As for part (iii), we obtain that for β > βn the relative age effect under rule CP
converges to
B¯CP =
(
(2 + γ)
2−µ
1
−µ1−2µ
1
2
x− (1 + γ)(µ¯1 − µ
1
)x
)
+λx
2
[
(2 + γ)(2− µ
1
)− 2µ
1
− (1 + γ)µ¯1
]
.
The observation that this expression can be smaller than B¯PP and even negative for
β = βn can be made from figure 3, where an example of such a situation is depicted.
Concerning monotonicity, we observe that all three summands in the square bracket
multiplied with λ are decreasing with respect to β. Hence B¯CP is decreasing in β for
sufficiently large λ and by the same arguments as used in the proof of part (ii) this
implies that also BCP in decreasing with respect to β. 
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